Military families get war-weary, and divorce rates climb relative to time-inservice and deployments. The spousal factor is most important to the best of our military who actually honor their commitments. First tour inputs matter, but especially with the heavy and long deployment commitments the force will maintain now and for the next thirty years Again, it starts and ends with a more honest accounting of those who are truly at their prime and those who would best serve the nation processing travel claims and doing my TPS reports.
Until you stop making real executive types work for janitors, any effort to keep people on for longer will be a waste. Our personnel system protects morons. Increasing the voluntary retirement age probably won't hurt - but that's only a partial solution. On the k model, it would be one more obstacle to overcome in attracting and keeping talent.
For many - why even join and assume the additional risk or even stay past 4 or 5 years enough to pay for college if there is no difference between the job I have now and the job I could have on the outside - save for at the outside job, no one is shooting at me.
The kind of leader who would do the "math" and leave the force under a k system is probably the kind of leader we want to retain - someone who thinks through second and third order effects and considers the quality of life those who depend on him will have. I admit we need to fix the system, but we need to do it in a way that preserves the retention value while simultaneously reducing costs.
So the answer is actually pretty simple:.
UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA
You figure out the average retirement age for an officer and an NCO at 20 years. If an officer retires at 20 years, he has to wait until he is 62 to being drawing pay and health benefits. Every year he serves past 20 drops that year by one, so if he serves 30 years he becomes immediately vested at retirement. You create a board and every officer is boarded one or two years before they hit the 20 mark to determine if they will be retained past After 20, promotion and retention boards are used to "control" how many people reach the 30 year mark.
For NCO's you do the same thing except they get their pay immediately and wait for healthcare. This makes alot more sense given that most people who retire between ages 38 and 42 or so find other work, work that includes health care options. This program will save a boat load of money and still help increase quality of life for retirees when they actually retire from the workforce. Further, we'll incentivize people to compete to stay past 20 - which is one of the complaints that have been made about the system - wasn't it SEC Gates who said we need to consider why we are paying people to leave in the prime of their careers - right when we want to keep them?
The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE): Working Papers
Even more money could be saved by increasing the VRA - but I am not entirely convinced that what could be saved would be worth the cost This article got me thinking on it though. Any system we create is bound to not be perfect, some will game the system and it won't answer all of the mail - but its a helluva lot better than any of the other money saving options being floated around and probably won't affect retention, and if it does only marginally.
First, the entire concept of a pension system must change and evolve into something akin to the federal TSP or civilian k. The current pension model, cash deferred compensation, is not sustainable. You also failed to include life expectancy statistics into your analysis — this is a key problem that is bankrupting pension models created after WWII.
- Table of Contents;
- Increase Military Professionalism: Extend the Voluntary Retirement Age | Small Wars Journal.
- Involuntary Separation!
This is a disgrace and it is prevalent in all Services. Other studies have shown, military officers are not as effective doing civilian work as their civilian counterparts — yet receive more compensation. These are known as boondoggles and are no longer affordable — please see my earlier post on the LCE. The budget is shrinking and the fiscal trade space is clear.
Having officers serve at grades longer will have many undesirable consequences. Eventually promotions will become a problem and the answer is not to create more senior billets.
Are you proposing to eliminate Goldwater Nichols? There is no greater drain on the Services than purple ticket punching. I see nothing in your argument that will improve our current manpower situation and many of your suggestions will only make problems worse.
Previous comments addressing the promotion system and the personnel system overall, first, are spot on. Anything else is akin to applying a bandaid when a pressure bandage is necessary. I think aging the force is a viable option that needs to be examined in light of personnel cuts. I agree with Pete Munson that "solving" personnel issues is certainly best undertaken holistically. But I also acknowledge that most change and reform comes incrementally over a few years rather than all at once.
It is better to begin the process somewhere rather than nowhere at all. The key vulnerability of aging the force is retention - if hope for promotion is low, than retention is low.
However, merely using promotion as an incentive to retention has the unhappy effect of diluting rank. So, perhaps the incentive to remain a corporal for six years is regular, substantial pay increases for time in service, increased educational opportunities how about an internship program for our NCOs? Some examples Why not have the strategic corporal as squad leaders possessing their own residential professional military education track?
The chance to go to recruiting or the drill field? What you gain by "aging" the force is increased responsibility at lower ranks coupled with greater experience at lower ranks. Military service still remains attractive due to pay, benefits, increased responsibility, and real, long-term investment in people. We already have more than enough marginally competent to incompetent people hanging on until 20 years in positions and ranks beyond their capability due to our up or out system, the dangling carrot of the retirement, and our inability to separate wheat from chaff.
Keeping these people on for longer will only further burden our system with poor performers, long past their utility. For this purpose, the State shall endeavor to streamline government functions and to maintain necessary positions through an appropriate retirement and voluntary separation scheme. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two 2 consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation.
Early Retirement and Voluntary Separation Benefits. Additional Benefits. Exclusiveness of Benefits.
Abolition of Positions. For purposes of this Act, "head of government office or agency" refers to the Secretary in the case of bureaus, divisions and other offices under a department; governor or mayor, as the case may be, in the case of local government units; the Chief of Justice in the case of the employees of the Judiciary; the Senate President or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, in the case of employees of the Legislature; the Chairman in the case of the Constitutional Commissions; and in the case of other offices not within the authority of those previously mentioned, their overall superior.
The application for early retirement or voluntary separation shall be accepted unless the services of the applicant shall be deemed necessary. The application of those with pending administrative cases punishable by dismissal or removal shall be held in abeyance until the final disposition of such cases without prejudice to their receiving benefits under this law in case of acquittal. The applications of those with criminal cases of grave nature committed in relation to their office shall be held in abeyance.
In subsections a and b , the references to "performance" ratings and ratings of "satisfactory" are added on authority of former section , which is carried into section Standard changes are made to conform with the definitions applicable and the style of this title as outlined in the preface to the report. Section 8 b of the Soil Conservation and Allotment Act, referred to in subsec.
Section 10 b of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, referred to in subsec. The Workforce Investment Act of , referred to in subsec. Section a 2 A of the Act was classified to former section a 2 A of Title Pursuant to section a of Title 29 , references to a provision of the Workforce Investment Act of are deemed to refer to the corresponding provision of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, Pub. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables.
Prior to amendment, subsec. C generally. Prior to amendment, subpar.
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C read as follows: "is entitled to credit for service rendered as an employee of a county committee established pursuant to section h b of title 16 , or of a committee or an association of producers described in section b of title 7. A and B , and, in subpar. C , substituted " section h b of title 16 " and " section b of title 7 " for "section 8 b of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act 16 U.
For provisions relating to promulgation of regulations necessary to carry out amendment by section d 1 of Pub.